Abstract A variation of Fitch's paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn't know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch's paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the paradox.
Introduction
Fitch's paradox is the fact that certain sets of assumptions imply, by what is called the Church-Fitch argument, that φ → K (φ). There are various different choices for the sets of assumptions, and we will initially start from the following one, call it F:
-D-Rule: From ¬φ, infer¬P(φ).
is to weaken or alter the assumptions so that the unreasonable conclusion no longer follows. Therefore there may be many different resolutions to a paradox, and it may be subjective which is better, if any. Accordingly, in this article I will demonstrate one resolution, and, though I will argue for its philosophical plausibility, I do not intend to champion it above other known resolutions.
The assumption I will target for removal is K (K (φ) → φ). The reader may object that this is not one of the assumptions listed! It merely follows from them. That it follows from them is a special case of the Church-Fitch argument, if nothing else. Which leads us to ask:
Informal Question: Can K (K (φ) → φ) be proved from F by a different method than variation on the Church-Fitch argument?
I have not managed to do so, and I very tentatively conjecture the answer is "no", though I do not know for sure. Suppose that the answer really is "no". Then any resolution which blocks the Church-Fitch argument and goes no further, will necessarily block all the proofs of K (K (φ) → φ), unless there be something special about this particular instance of the argument, against the spirit of the Question. If the Answer is indeed "no", then an optimal resolution of the paradox must eliminate K (K (φ) → φ) as a consequence of F (or of whatever system replaces F). For example, from F, the intuitionist can deduce ¬¬K (K (φ) → φ), following Church and Fitch till the end. To cover the final gap, the intuitionist needs a whole new tactic, whose existence would positively answer the Question. Maybe the intuitionist could simply add K (K (φ) → φ) as an axiom in addition to letting intuitionism destroy the paradox, but that resolution would not be "optimal". The point of all this is to justify the choice of targeting K (K (φ) → φ): if it has to go in any case, why not aim at it directly?
My aim is to break up the rules of inference, which can be thought of as huge indivisible assumptions, into smaller pieces (together capable of taking the rules' place). More smaller assumptions means more flexibility choosing how to resolve the paradox, unfortunately such new resolutions will probably not translate into resolutions for the familiar form of the paradox (we are saddened that this may justifiably render our result an outlier in the bigger picture of Fitch's paradox). The smaller assumptions will be axiom schema instead of rules, and one will be the schema K (K (φ) → φ). I will discard this schema and show the paradox dissolves.
To see that discarding K (K (φ) → φ) is philosophically plausible, consider Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem: assuming PA is consistent, the arithmetist's knowledge is factive, but she cannot be certain of it. Kritchman and Raz (2010) demonstrated that a similar knowledge paradox, the surprise examination paradox, can be resolved in part by (in essence) altering the definition of surprise to say that unsound knowers are surprised by everything. The students in Kritchman and Raz's treatment are sound, but (in the resolution) they interpret their teacher's ambiguous announcement using the modified definition of surprise, acknowledging that they might be unsound. The same trick was also used by Halpern and Moses (1986) . Factive knowers failing K (K (φ) → φ) can also be found in the semantics of impossible-worlds structures (as defined, for example, by Duc (2001, pp. 21-22) ).
But this justification is limited to particular concrete knowers inside closed systems, about whom we possess meta-knowledge. What about our own knowledge, or the total idealized knowledge of mankind? Surely that knowledge is factive (if the barest foundations of science are) and what's more, we know it, or at least we presuppose it in our struggle to define knowledge at all. The situation is similar to how non-paradoxical third-party Moore's paradoxes ("He's factive and he doesn't know it") become paradoxical when there's only one voice ("We're factive and we don't know it"). In short, this article mainly applies to specific, formal knowers. This is unsatisfying since the most profound questions in the Fitch's paradox debate are directly concerned with the general meta-knowledge.
Still I can offer one desperate throe in the face of the above. We can speak of limit knowledge, saying that a fact is limit known if it is eventually always known after some point. Mathematics periodically suffers errors which spread far enough to be considered part of the mathematical knowledge. There may be cofinally many moments when we discover error and fail to know our present factivity, so the fact we are factive might not be limit knowledge. But all errors are eventually corrected, no error becomes limit knowledge, and limit knowledge is factive.
The paradox
Work in a language L , propositional 1 except for exactly two new unary modal operators K and P. I will give an entirely axiomatic version of the Fitch assumptions, but some machinery is needed. Call a formula propositional if it has the form ρ ∧ σ, ρ ∨ σ, ρ → σ, ρ ↔ σ , or ¬ρ. Now, call a formula valid if it can be proved by classic propositional logic treating non-propositional formulas as atoms (an idea inspired by Carlson (2000) ). That is, φ is valid if and only if it is True according to every truth assignment to the subformulas of φ which respects ∧, ∨, →, ↔ and ¬.
Thus
is not. Any valid formula holds in any model where the semantics of propositional connectives are classical. Whenever is a set of axioms, write | φ to mean φ can be proved from propositionally, treating non-propositional formulas as atoms.
Our Fitch assumptions are the following set S of axioms:
whenever φ is an instance of E1, E2, or E3.
The names of E1-E3 were chosen to match names used by Carlson (2000, pp. 56 
. This is a modification of the classical ChurchFitch argument. The original argument was published by Fitch (1963) after it was communicated to him by an anonymous referee who we now know was Alonzo Church. In the following argument (except line 8), we work in propositional logic, treating non-propositional formulas as atoms.
Lines 7-12 illustrate how the axioms in S perform work traditionally done by rules of inference. If we strengthened E-closure to also include K (φ) whenever φ is an instance of C, D, or (recursively) E-closure, the resulting system would enjoy the full rule of necessitation φ/K (φ).
One feature of this axiomatic version of Fitch's paradox is that in principle we can use it to write Fitch's paradox as a single logical tautology schema. This can be done by reverse-engineering lines 1-17 above to obtain a tautology of the form
where is a giant conjunction of specific axioms (depending uniformly on φ) of S. Since the conclusion is K (φ) and one of the hypotheses is K (K (¬K (φ)) → ¬K (φ)), this is almost a kind of weak propositional version of Löb's Theorem.
Avoiding paradox by weakening E-closure
Let S be the following set of axioms:
-Weak E-Closure: K (φ) whenever φ is an instance of E1 or E2.
We will show these axioms do not imply Fitch's paradox: resolving it, in the sense of Chow (1998) .
Theorem Let L be the language, propositional except for two new unary connectives K and P, with a single atom q. Then S | q → K (q).
Proof Let be the following set of L -axioms:
For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let N i be the L -model defined as follows:
-N i treats propositional sentences inductively in the classical way. I will show both N i | S . I claim this is enough to prove the theorem: evidently N 1 and N 2 interpret K identically, so if N 1 | K (q) then so does N 2 , which would contradict that N 2 | q and N 2 models K (q) → q. In the following Claims, N shall stand for either N 1 or N 2 interchangeably.
Since φ follows propositionally from ∅, it certainly follows from .
Claim 3 N | K (φ) whenever φ is an instance of E1 or E2.
If φ is an instance of E1 or E2, then φ ∈ , so | φ, so N | K (φ).
Claim 4 N | K (φ) → φ.
Assume N | K (φ). Then | φ. By Claims 1-3, N | . Thus N | φ.
Claim 5 N | φ → P(K (φ)).
In fact, N | P(K (φ)), a much stronger fact. To see this, define a new L -model
Claim 6 N | K (¬φ) → ¬P(φ).
Assume N | K (¬φ). Then | ¬φ. Therefore, it is not the case that | ¬φ.
Thus N | P(φ). Thus N | ¬ P(φ).
By the above claims, N | S , as desired.
This resolution preserves the knowability thesis, that all truths are knowable, which I hope will please the verificationists, though I might have gone too far. In proving Claim 5, we actually showed that in this particular model, everything is knowable, whether true or false.
